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Section 1: Evidencing that a ‘Walk Away’ social heuristic can lead to assortment of 
cooperative agents in a population with fission-fusion group dynamics  
Social structures based around dynamic group membership are ubiquitous within the animal 
kingdom [1, 2]. Since previous models investigating the extent to which a ‘Walk Away’ rule 
can drive positive assortment by propensity to cooperate have not captured these social 
dynamics [3-5, but see 6 where individuals can leave a group prior to any interaction], it is 
unclear if a ‘Walk Away’ rule can generate such assortment in systems where groups 
stochastically split and merge (i.e. the dynamic fission and fusion of groups typifying many 
social species). We therefore use a simulation model to explore the proposition that a ‘Walk 
Away’ heuristic can generate positive assortment of social interactions by individual 
cooperative phenotypes in the highly dynamic social environments that typify many social 
vertebrates. 
 
We implemented an agent-based, steady-state stochastic simulation model of fission and 
fusion in the spirit of existing merge and split models [7, 8] to generate conditions 
representing a highly dynamic fission-fusion system (see detailed methods below). Our key 
addition was that the phenotypes of the group members (45 obligate co-operators and 45 
obligate defectors, each with a given tolerance for defection, Ei) played a part in determining 
the membership of daughter groups after fission. Briefly, in our model, we associated each 
fission event of a parent group with a public-goods game, yielding a return R for each group 
member. An individual’s satisfaction at the outcome of the game was Si=R-Eii, where Ei is 
the individual’s ‘tolerance’ for defection (see detailed methods below). Satisfied agents (Si ≥ 
0) joined either of two daughter groups with equal probability. Dissatisfied agents (Si < 0) 
could ‘Walk Away’, either by forming a new group of their own, or by joining any one of the 
other groups in the population, including the two daughter groups (Fig. S1A,B). From the 
simulation we collected 2500 independent censuses (every 10,000 timesteps) of group 
membership to form a weighted network of associations (see detailed methods below). As a 
control, we ran a neutral model where we randomised the membership of the groups recorded 
in each census in the ‘Walk Away’ model.  
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 Fig S1.  Simulation model ‘Walk Away’ rule implementation with illustrative graphical output. 
(A-B) Individual conditional movement decisions made at group fission when a ‘Walk Away’ rule is 
imposed on an agent-based, steady-state simulation model with fission–fusion dynamics. (A) 
‘Satisfied’ individuals are those whose minimum return from being in the group is met (R-Ei>0, see 
text), while (B) ‘unsatisfied’ individuals are those whose minimum have not been met (R-Ei<0). (C-F) 
Graphs of interactions between agents in the model whose association indices are greater than (C-D) 
0.042 and (E-F) 0.06 with (C,E) a ‘Walk Away’ rule imposed and (D,F) a neutral model. Node colour 
indicates phenotype (green=co-operator, blue=defector), node size indicates, E, as higher (smaller 
nodes due to lower E) and lower (larger nodes due to higher E) tolerance for defection (range 0.2-0.8), 
lines indicate dyadic connections greater than the respective filtering thresholds. 
 
The results of the model demonstrate that even against a dynamic background of fission and 
fusion, a simple ‘Walk Away’ rule can drive social assortment by cooperative phenotype 
(Fig. S1C,E and Fig. S2); when agents use a walk away strategy, the assortment of social ties 
by cooperative phenotype within the population become significantly greater than zero with 
increasing tie strength, which is not the case in a neutral model (Figs. S1D,F, S2A and S3).  
 
Detailed methods 
Agent-based simulation model 
The model population consisted of 90 agents, 45 obligate co-operators and 45 obligate 
defectors. Agents were in groups, whose size and composition were subject to fission-fusion 
dynamics implemented through probabilistic rules. At each timestep there was a small 
probability (3.5x10-5√(s1s2)) that two groups of size s1 and s2 would fuse to form a group of 
size s1+s2; thus large groups were more likely to fuse than were small groups. There was also 
a small constant probability (0.004, irrespective of size) that a given group would split and 
decision rules were implemented at these fission events. Our split and merge rules allowed us 
to mimic a biologically realistic monotonically decreasing group size as typically observed in 
fission fusion social systems [9].  
 
Each agent was assigned a phenotype along a gradient of values, spread evenly in the range 
0.2 to 0.8, that determined its “expectation”, Ei, of the cooperative behaviour of others in the 
group. For example, the lowest E-values (0.2 to 0.4) had lower expectations and therefore can 
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be considered more ‘tolerant’ of defection. At the moment of fission we assumed that the 
focal group had just undergone a cooperative game. Each co-operator in the group 
contributed 1 point to a shared “pool”, defectors contributed 0. The value of the pool was 
multiplied by 1.9 [as in 3, 4], then shared equally among all group members. This “return” 
from the game, R, minus an agent’s expectation Ei, determined its ‘satisfaction’ with being in 
the group at the time of the fission event: Si=R-Ei. The satisfied agents (those with Si≥0) split 
into two daughter groups (Fig. S1). Each satisfied agent had a 50% chance of being placed in 
each of the two groups. Agents that were not satisfied (Si<0) had a tendency to ‘walk away’; 
they either formed a group of N=1 or joined an existing group with equal likelihood of 
joining any particular group, including each of the daughter groups formed by the fission of 
satisfied agents (Fig. S1). After 50,000 timesteps at which point the model had reached 
steady-state (dynamic equilibrium), we monitored group membership every 10,000 timesteps, 
in a series of 2,500 censuses of the population. The 10,000 timestep interval was derived 
from our expectation in the neutral model that every agent had had the opportunity to be in a 
group with every other agent over that period, which allowed us to produce censuses free of 
sequential correlation. For these associations we constructed a weighted 90x90 association  
 
 
Fig S2. Assortment by cooperativeness in the social networks sampled from an agent-based, 
steady-state simulation model with fission–fusion dynamics. (A) The assortivity coefficient, r, is an 
indicator of the overall assortivity of associations in the population by cooperative phenotype (see 
Methods) with a ‘Walk Away’ rule imposed (green) and without such a rule (blue). T is the threshold 
over which agents must associate to be assigned a tie strength of one in a binary association matrix. 
Error bars = +/- 1𝜎 and indicate whether the value of r differs from zero at a given T (see Methods). 
(B) The fraction of ties, ρ, that have an association index greater than our filtering threshold, T, in our 
‘Walk Away’ and neutral models. The decrease reflects the fact that a smaller fraction of the 
population had stronger ties.  
 
A B 
4 
 
 
Fig. S3. Frequency of tie ‘types’ in the sampled networks. (A-C) The proportion of edges in the 
network, e, that are represented by the three phenotypic dyad types (C,C = co-operator-co-operator, 
C,D = co-operator-defector, D,D = defector-defector) with the ‘Walk Away’ rule implemented (green) 
and in the null model (blue). 
 
matrix W, whose entry Wij was the fraction of censuses in which agents i and j were in the 
same group. All agents occurred at least once with all others, so all Wij>0. Our neutral model 
used the same group sizes as the original model at every census, but the groups were 
populated randomly with respect to S. 
 
Analysis of simulation data 
To analyse whether the implementation of a ‘Walk Away’ rule was sufficient to maintain 
long-term assortment in our population, despite rapid fission-fusion dynamics, we 
A 
B 
C 
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constructed a series of binary matrices A(T) whose entry Aij(T) was 1 if Wij≥T, and 0 
otherwise. T is a threshold fraction of times agents were found in the same group in our 2,500 
censuses. As T increased, the density of A (ρ , the fraction of elements that are 1) decreased 
reflecting the fact strong associations were found between a smaller fraction of agents (Fig. 
S1). For each A(T), we computed Newman’s assortativity coefficient r [10] which measures 
whether there are more CC and/or DD pairs in our groups than if edges were wired at random 
(Fig. S2). This is our measure of assortment in the population. A jack-knife procedure was 
used to test whether the computed values of r were significantly greater than zero in each of 
our models [10].  
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Section 2: Supplementary detail on methods and results of the main experiment. 
 
Table S1.  Number of focal individuals tested at each level in the study’s main experiment. N 
denotes the number of biological replicates (focal individuals). 
 
Inspection 
condition  
Social 
experience 
Diet type 
(inspection 
phase) N 
No predator 
present 
Cooperation Bloodworm 14 
  Daphnia sp. 16 
  Total 30 
 Defection Bloodworm 16 
  Daphnia sp. 17 
  Total 33 
 Total Bloodworm 30 
 
 
Daphnia sp. 33 
  Total 63 
Predator 
present 
Cooperation Bloodworm 16 
  Daphnia sp. 17 
  Total 33 
 Defection Bloodworm 16 
  Daphnia sp. 17 
  Total 33 
 Total Bloodworm 32 
 
 
Daphnia sp. 34 
 
 
Total 66 
Total Cooperation Bloodworm 30 
  
Daphnia sp. 33 
  Total 63 
 
Defection Bloodworm 32 
  
Daphnia sp. 34 
  Total 66 
 Total Bloodworm 62 
 
 
Daphnia sp. 67 
    Total 129 
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Table S2. Results of the analysis of the main experiment testing for an effect of the 
inspection condition that fish were in (no predator present, i.e. control, versus predator 
present, i.e. experimental), the social environment that fish experienced during the inspection 
portion of a trial (cooperative vs. non-cooperative), the type of diet (daphnia or bloodworm) 
that novel shoaling partners had been fed on and their interactions including the inspection 
behaviour of focal individuals in the model (removed in final model). Note: we did not have 
inspection data for 4 focal individuals in the control inspection condition (no predator 
present) due to video failures. 
 
Source F(1,116) p 
Inspection behaviour 0.393 0.532 
Inspection condition 0.749 0.388 
Social experience 5.915 0.017 
Diet type 5.171 0.025 
Inspection condition * Social experience 5.714 0.018 
Inspection condition * Diet type 0.015 0.903 
Social experience * Diet type 2.517 0.115 
Inspection condition * Social experience * Diet type 0.116 0.734 
 
 
 
